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Digging Into Selection Criteria For Accelerator Acceptance:
What Kind of Business Owners Are More Attractive?
ABSTRACT
Drawing on signaling theory, we aid in the identification of the rarely acknowledged impact of 
business owner’s features on acceptance to accelerator programs. Using a multi-national sample 
of 10,298 observations for startups in 166 countries over 2016-2018, we show that accelerators do 
not evaluate applicants uniformly. We find that entrepreneurs from developing countries are less 
likely to be accepted by accelerators than entrepreneurs from developed economies. 
Counterintuitively, we also find an advantage for female entrepreneurs in accelerator acceptance. 
Further, our results suggest a positive impact of education. Accelerators are a growing provider of 
entrepreneurial resources and a main driver of growth and innovativeness. Despite the extant 
literature demonstrating the benefits of accelerators, determinants of acceptance to these programs, 
particularly at the individual level, are underexplored. Here, we extend entrepreneurship literature 
and show some sources of variation in access to international accelerator programs. Our
comparative study enhances business owners’ insight for application to entrepreneurial resources.
Keywords Accelerator acceptance; Developed vs developing; International entrepreneurship; 
Signaling theory; Gender; Education
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1. Introduction
Entrepreneurship is a widely known catalyst of changes in the economy and a key driver of 
economic growth. While new ventures contribute to national income and employment rates, many 
of them suffer from a lack of access to external services, particularly in developing economies
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Ratten, Ferreir, and Fernandes, 2016). Therefore, 
access to global initiatives that support growth-oriented entrepreneurs is highly valuable for 
ventures and international entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurial incubation programs have attracted more
attention from scholars and practitioners in the last decade (e.g., Crișan, Salanță, Beleiu, Bordean, 
and Bunduchi 2019). Particularly, scholars have been interested in the subset of incubators known 
as accelerators, which have a stronger focus on growing a nascent firm (Bosma and Stam, 2012). 
The number of accelerators in the USA has increased from 1 in 2005 to 578 in 2016 (Small 
Business Trends, 2016), attesting to the mounting importance of this recent addition to 
assistantship programs.     
Accelerator programs, defined as, “fixed-term, cohort-based program, including 
mentorship and educational components that culminate in a public pitch-event or demo-day”
(Cohen and Hochberg, 2014, p. 4), provide many benefits to new ventures. Particularly, prior 
studies suggest accelerators may improve firm performance (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Ensley, Carland, and Carland, 1998; Shrader and Siegel, 2007) and provide newer firms with an 
office space, financial resources, physical resources, and access to networks (Carayannis and Von 
Zedtwitz, 2005; Cohen and Hochberg, 2014; Plummer, Allison, and Connelly, 2016; Roberts and 
Lall, 2019). Bearse (1998) noted that an incubatee survival rate is about 80 percent, well above 
typical levels observed among fledgling firms that were not enrolled in such programs.  Similarly, 
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Smilor (1987) found that acceptance into incubation programs gave firms structure, credibility, 
and offered administrative support.
Despite strong empirical and theoretical arguments for the desirability of accelerator 
acceptance, little research has been performed regarding the factors that lead to admission into an 
accelerator program for nascent firms. Individual-level features of business owners from multiple 
countries can create biases toward the desirability of their ventures, but such variables remain 
underexplored in accelerator acceptance literature. Using signaling theory (Certo, 2003; Connelly, 
Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel, 2011; Spence, 1978), we seek to understand how some of the salient 
and observable features of business owners, including their country of birth, gender, and 
education, can influence their chances of acceptance into such programs. Due to a high application 
volume from all over the world (Cohen, 2013), accelerator programs accept only a very small 
percentage of ventures (Cohen, 2013). High competition among ventures results in a complicated 
selection process in which accelerators use observable features (i.e., signals) (Spence, 2002) to 
screen applicants. As such, it is imperative for business owners to send signals that effectively 
present the quality of their ventures. By examining signals that are effective in gleaning accelerator 
acceptance, we would be able to explain variation in acceptance into these programs for 
entrepreneurs from multiple countries.
We examine several factors, including a lead founder’s country of birth, gender, and an
educational level. Since accelerators usually rely on external team "signals" (i.e., indicators of a 
firm's capabilities), a selection process may be challenging due to a lack of sufficient information 
(Cohen, 2013). Accelerators prefer face-to-face physical or online interviews with a founding team 
(Pauwels, Clarysse, Wright, and Van Hove, 2016), often represented by a lead founder. As such, 
we mainly focus on lead founders and signals that their team might send to evaluators. Country of 
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birth affects founders’ values, cognitive schema, demeanor, and language (Hambrick, Davison, 
Snell, and Snow, 1998). Education is a known and significant contributor to firm’s performance 
(Hambrick, Cho, and Chen, 1996) and innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). We also focus on
gender which is a traditional source of bias in interpreting individual behaviors and abilities (Alsos 
and Ljunggren, 2017; Gupta, Turban, Wasti, and Siktar, 2009; Harrison and Mason, 2007).
We argue that ventures will be considered more favorably and more likely to be accepted 
by accelerators when their lead founder is from a developed country. On the contrary, ventures 
will be less likely to be accepted when a lead founder is from a developing country. We also
predict that, compared to men, female lead founders have a higher chance of being accepted.
Additionally, we hypothesize that educational level has a positive impact on accelerator 
acceptance. Using a sample of 203 accelerators and 10,298 observations for 2324 startups in 166
countries over 2016-2018, we test our hypotheses and find support for our arguments. Figure 1 
indicates the acceptance to accelerator programs for founders from different continents and 
provides information for the comparative purposes in our global sample.
-------------------------------
Insert Figure 1 about here
-------------------------------
Our paper offers several contributions. First, through the interplay of signaling theory and 
international entrepreneurship assistantship literature, we highlight the individual aspects of 
startups in access to accelerator programs. By doing so, we extend the growing research on 
antecedents of acceptance to accelerators (Yang, Kher, and Newbert, 2020) and directly respond 
to calls for a more nuanced examination of evaluation by entrepreneurship resource providers
(Shepherd, Williams, and Patzel, 2015), specifically by accelerators (Drover, Busenitz, Matusik, 
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Townsend, Anglind, and Dushnitsky, 2017). Second, examination of the impact of a lead founder’s 
country of birth (i.e., international versus domestic) offers promising research directions for 
scholars in international entrepreneurship. Moreover, this study adds to our knowledge of 
comparative research on entrepreneurs’ features for a global investigation of accelerator 
acceptance. Particularly, we show continents from which founders have a highest chance of 
acceptance to accelerators. Finally, by uncovering features leading to accelerator’s acceptance, we 
desire to offer practical suggestions for entrepreneurs to improve their chance of being selected by 
accelerators, a milestone achievement for resource-constrained new ventures.
2. Theoretical background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Venture selection and incubator acceptance
Previous literature heavily focused on entrepreneurs' features, such as education and gender and 
their impact on firms' financial performance (Cooper, Gimeno-Gaskon, and Woo, 1994; Cassar, 
2014). We extend this literature by discussing the impact of these features on accelerator’s 
acceptance. Particularly, we study how founders’ country of birth, gender, and educational level 
may impact an accelerator's acceptance. We focus on lead founders because accelerators often 
interview them (Gonzales-Uribe and Leatherbee, 2017) while going through a very competitive 
selection process from a large and diverse pool of applicants.
Literature highlights the importance of accelerators by noting that "without the incubator, 
most of the entrepreneurs would either not be in business or struggle to remain in business" (Plosila 
and Allen, 1985, p. 22). Furthermore, scholars argue that incubators provide ventures with various
benefits, including below-market office space rent, mutual incubatee assistance and/or purchasing 
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agreements, business consulting services, and technological and networking assistance (Allen and 
Rahman, 1985; Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988; Temali and Campbell, 1984). 
Here, we focus on a specific type of incubators – accelerators, which are different from 
other types of incubators as they are typically shorter in time and focus on scaling up as opposed 
to starting up new ventures (Cohen, 2013). Accelerators can be described by the following 
characteristics: their programs usually last around three months; they buy ventures’ equity in return 
for accelerating firms; they usually help competitive ventures at an early stage; they offer seminars
and mentorship; and they often have a designated location (Cohen, 2013). Often, accelerators’ 
applicants are driven by a higher growth and return on investment (ROI) (Isabelle, 2013) which 
become one of the primary areas of interest for evaluators (Bosma and Stam, 2012). Accepted 
applicants often enjoy a higher survival rates after accelerators’ programs (Isabelle, 2013) and 
accelerators get a firm’s share to get a faster return on investment (Isabelle, 2013) by aligning 
interests of investors and ventures. Therefore, it is imperative to understand what accelerators' 
requirements are and how to best fit accelerators’ expectations (Isabelle, 2013). 
2.2 Signaling theory
We apply signaling theory to this study because of our focus on information asymmetries; in our 
study, accelerators lack sufficient information about ventures (Connelly et al., 2011). The focus of 
signaling theory is to reduce the information asymmetry between two parties (Spence, 2002). We 
have two parties, represented by a new venture, accelerator’s applicant, which applies into a 
program by sending some information (i.e., signals) about its current capabilities (Filatotchev and 
Bishop, 2002), and an accelerator that receives that information (i.e., signals) from a new venture. 
Such information is necessary to reduce the information asymmetry between two parties and 
sending right signals may be viewed as a part of a firm’s strategy (Connelly et al., 2011). 
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2.3 Country of birth and accelerator acceptance
Several large public companies, such Intel, eBay, Yahoo!, or Google, had at least one foreign 
founder (Achidi, Ndofor, and Priem, 2011). However, these large companies with foreign founders 
are not the only ones that provide economic benefits to the market.  There are many small firms 
with foreign founders that stimulate economic growth. According to various studies on cultural 
diversity (Hambrick et al., 1998; Hofstede, 1984), ethnicity or country of birth affects an individual 
in various ways, including how an individual perceives teamwork, views relationships with those 
higher in a rank, and chooses to communicate with subordinates. To help understand how cultural 
differences affect managerial techniques and philosophies, Hofstede (1984) proposed several 
cultural dimensions - individualism versus collectivism, large versus small power distance, strong 
versus weak uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity versus femininity. Some individuals, despite 
being born in a specific country, may not be true representatives of that country (Hambrick et al., 
1998). However, the country of birth is a signal that can impact interpretations about individual 
behavior. 
Stakeholders, particularly investors, pay close attention to where a founding team, 
including a lead founder, comes from (Chaganti et al., 2008; Ndofor and Priem, 2011; Saxenian, 
2002). Often, entrepreneurship in a foreign country entails negative consequences since foreign 
entrepreneurs lack country-specific knowledge - language, traditions, and culture (Aliaga-Isla and 
Rialp, 2013; Teixeira et al., 2007).  Many studies have been done on managers’ country of birth 
and its impact on a firm’s financial performance. Chaganti et al. (2008) examined ethnic immigrant 
versus non-ethnic non-immigrant teams in new internet ventures and found that ethnic-immigrant 
teams were more aggressive. Similarly, Chand and Ghorbani (2011) found that country of birth 
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had an impact on firm performance when studying social networks, particularly how founders 
formed their connections. 
Developed countries are often associated with functional laws, and are overall perceived 
to be more trustworthy. On the other hand, developing countries are subject to more scrutiny due 
to an often corrupt environment and non-transparent ways of conducting business (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006). Due to information asymmetry, there is always room for "cheating". That is, one 
party can send incomplete or even false information (Connelly et al., 2011). This concern can be 
alleviated when there is more transparency and regulation. Additionally, ventures coming from 
developing countries find it harder to establish their legitimacy because stakeholders initially take 
time to establish trust with such organizations (Ahlstrom et al., 2008). Moreover, many of the 
accelerator programs are located in developed countries and it is likely that they perceive less
information asymmetry and more similarity in their interactions with applicants from developed 
countries. Building on extant research, we posit that entrepreneurs originating from a developed 
country will signal superior environmental/organizational fit, networking capability, and resource 
acquisition capability relative to those who are not, ceteris paribus.
H1. New ventures with a lead founder from a developed country are more likely to be accepted 
by accelerators. 
2.4 Gender and accelerator acceptance
Most of the previous studies suggest that women may experience prejudice when attempting to 
gain access to resources, particularly financial capital (e.g., Alsos & Ljunggren, 2017; Gupta et al.,
2009). Many contexts such as debt, business angel, and venture capital financing confirm this 
disadvantage (e.g., Harrison & Mason, 2007). However, some recent studies show that for 
9
crowdfunding, women are more likely to access resources compared to their male counterparts 
(Powell & Eddleston, 2013). Accelerator programs are specifically seeking to support promising 
groups that are not easily identified and supported by others. 
Female entrepreneurs form a novel and favorable market for capital providers (Carter et 
al., 2007). Due to the reformed gender perception in society in recent years, more investors have
recognized women's competency in the business world. These changes along with the record of 
many successful female entrepreneurs have started to modify traditional gender biases (Rocha, & 
Van Praag, 2020). Opposed to previous studies that argue female-led ventures have lower 
performance than male-led ventures (Du Rietz & Henrekson, 2000), a growing number of studies 
suggest no significant difference between these ventures (Jennings & Brush, 2013; Rocha & Van 
Praag, 2020) or even an advantage for female-led firms (e.g. Robb & Watson, 2012). Due to 
historical barriers for women in attaining entrepreneurial resources (e.g., Marlow & Patton, 2005), 
women who run businesses are the survivors of discriminatory processes and tend to be remarkably 
competent (Eagly & Carli, 2003). In addition to high competency, women are also perceived to be 
more trustworthy (Eckes, 2002; Maddux & Brewer, 2005).  Because of the information asymmetry 
between partners (Maxwell & Lévesque, 2014), entrepreneurs’ behavioral intentions constitute a 
key factor for investment decisions and trust plays a critical role (Warnick et al., 2018). The high 
trustworthiness of women as well as their competence make them appealing for accelerators. 
Moreover, supporting underrepresented groups can bring legitimacy for accelerators in the 
external environment (Certo, 2003) and help them in building reputations over time. In addition to 
positive financial returns, accelerators aim to generate social and/or environmental impact (Lall et 
al., 2013). Research supports the idea that women are more likely to engage in corporate social 
responsibility (e.g., Setó-Pamies, 2015), which makes women a good fit for accelerators, which 
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usually seek to contribute to society. In sum, since accelerators focus mainly on empowering 
capable business owners whose potentials are not evident to others, we expect female advantage 
in access to accelerator programs.  
H2. New ventures with a female lead founder are more likely to be accepted by accelerators. 
2.5 Education and accelerator acceptance
Studies suggested that the educational level in founding teams led to increased innovativeness and 
improved financial performance (Delmar and Davidsson, 2000; Robinson and Sexton, 1994). 
Signaling theory is primarily focused on sending deliberate and positive information to a receiver 
to demonstrate its positive attributes (Connelly et al., 2011). The level of education is associated 
with many positive characteristics, including the greater propensity of action, competitive 
behaviors, and greater financial performance (Hambrick et al., 1996), greater capital raised during 
an IPO (Zimmerman, 2008), and innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989). Moreover, successful 
founders are good at recognizing an opportunity (Hofer and Sandberg, 1987) and executing it for 
fruitful financial performance (Chandler and Jansen, 1992). Recognizing an opportunity itself
requires competence (Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Pavett and Lau, 1983). To be competent in a 
technical-functional role founders must know how to use tools and how to operate processes 
(Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Pavett and Lau, 1983). A higher level of education provides all these 
types of competence and teaches how to use tools in the technical-functional role (Baum and 
Payea, 2004). 
“Participating in an accelerator program may not necessarily keep the venture (or the 
venture idea) alive; instead, it may speed up the cycle of the venture - leading to quicker growth” 
(Cohen, 2013, p.21). That is, given the often-short duration of an accelerator program - usually 
three months (Cohen, 2013), accelerators should choose wisely and pick those ventures that can 
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benefit the most out of such a short program. Founders with higher university training compared 
to those without this documented record of knowledge would probably be more appealing to 
accelerators because knowledge signals the ability to generate profit. Therefore, it is plausible to 
consider that a higher educational level of founders will lead to accelerator’s acceptance. 
H3. New ventures with more educated founders are more likely to be accepted by accelerators. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample and data
Our dataset consists of a sample of 2324 international and domestic firms, which applied for 
accelerators between 2013 and 2018. This survey-based data is extracted from the 
Entrepreneurship Database Program (EDP). Data were collected first when entrepreneurs applied 
to the accelerator and follow-ups were conducted on an annual basis.  Since 2016 was the first year
that data on acceptance was collected, our final sample is limited to 2016 - 2018. After dealing 
with missing values, we were left with 10,298 observations, which were Winsorized at the 1 and 
99 percentile levels to reduce the effect of outliers. 
3.2 Variables
Dependent Variable: Acceptance was coded as a dichotomous variable with “1” being 
assigned to firms that were accepted and “0” to firms that applied but were not accepted.  
Independent Variables: According to the ANDE Annual Report (2018) the first founder 
listed should be considered the lead founder of the venture.  Country of origin was operationalized 
by the level of development of the country that the lead founder came from. We used the natural
logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita as a proxy for country development. 
Gender was operationalized by a dichotomous variable with “1” assigned to women and “0” to 
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men. For Education, we used the highest level of education attained, with options including none, 
primary school, middle school, high school, technical/vocational school, associate's degree, 
bachelor's/honor’s degree, master's degree, and Ph.D., we operationalized this as an ordinal scale 
with values from “0” to “8" representing each of the levels in the dataset.  These values were then 
summed across the top members of the founding team, yielding the team education variable. 
Control Variables:  We controlled for the following variables. For Legal Status, which has 
the potential to impact strategy, structure, and policies (O'Connor & Raber, 2001), we used
dummies that show the status of the venture, including nonprofit, for-profit, and “undecided/other” 
being the reference group.  For Sector, we included four dummy variables to control for the 
economic sector of the startup, including health, information technology, and agriculture, with 
“other” serving as the reference group. For Financial Goals, since firm owner expectations of 
growth has been reported to have a positive relationship with actual firm growth (Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2003), we assigned a value of “1” to firms that wished to generate profits rather than 
merely cover their costs, and “0" otherwise. For Social Motive, as entrepreneurs’ motivation to 
achieve their visions would increase when that vision was more specific (Baum and Locke, 2004), 
we coded this variable as “1” for firms that expressed a specific social motive and “0” otherwise.
For Patents, as it shows the innovativeness capabilities (e.g., Baum et al., 2000), we coded this 
variable as a “1” if the firm held any patents and “0” otherwise. For Founder Age, we used the log 
of the lead entrepreneur's age to eliminate skewness. For Entrepreneurial Experience as an 
important factor (Hsu, 2007), we operationalized it as the sum of the total number of ventures that 
the founding team had started, including government and nonprofit as well as for-profit entities. 
For Impact Area we controlled for the social impact goals by including dummies for agricultural 
products, access to water, and community development, with “other” being the reference category.  
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Managerial Experience was coded “1” if the founder indicated any managerial experience in the 
survey and “0” otherwise.  For Social Signals, which can show legitimacy (Yang et al., 2020), we 
coded this dummy variable as “1” for firms that had received investments from sources such as 
crowdfunding, government, fellowship programs, business plan competitions, foundations, or
other nonprofit groups, and other companies, and "0" otherwise.  For Economic Signals and Self 
Funding in Past Year, we coded the venture as “1” if it had received funding from an outside source 
(economic signals) or a founder (self funding).  For Profitability, we used options ranging from 
negative to ranges from 0 to 5 percent, 6 to 10 percent, 11 to 15 percent, 16 to 20 percent, or more 
than 20 percent.  We operationalized this as an ordinal scale, with "1" representing negative 
profitability, and up to "6" constitute more than 20 percent.  
4. Results
Given that our dependent variable, Selected, is binary, we employed logit regressions to test our 
hypotheses. We used robust standard errors. Table 1 shows the descriptive analysis of the variables 
and their correlations. The correlation between accelerator acceptance with the country of birth, 
gender, and education is .03, .05 and .02, respectively. Each variable was tested for 
multicollinearity. Their variance inflation factors were all well below the recommended threshold 
of 5, suggesting no multicollinearity concern.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
-------------------------------
The results of the hypotheses tests are shown in Table 2. Model 1 contains all of our control 
variables.  Interestingly, we found that the impact of lead founder’s age on accelerator acceptance 
is positive, as one might expect, but insignificant.  Further, the results also indicate that the impact 
14
of the lead founder's experience on acceptance is negative on both a managerial and entrepreneurial 
level.  As we lack data regarding the performance of their prior ventures, we are unable to exclude 
the possibility of adverse selection in terms of failed entrepreneurs applying for accelerator 
programs.
Model 2 includes all control variables plus the extent of development for the lead founder’s 
country of birth. The significant and positive coefficient of the country of origin (β = .11, p < .01) 
supports Hypothesis 1, which predicted that firms with a lead founder from a more developed 
country would be more likely to be accepted.  In Model 3, we examine the impact of gender. The 
significant and positive coefficient of gender (β = .27, p < .01) supports Hypothesis 2. Consistent 
with this result, we conclude that a female lead founder has a higher chance of acceptance. Model 
4 examines our control variables with the addition of the founder team's education. The model (β 
= .01, p < .05) suggests that higher education of the founding team led to increased chances of 
being accepted by accelerators, supporting Hypothesis 3. Model 5 included all control variables 
plus all independent variables.  
-------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
-------------------------------
5. Discussion
Access to resources is a main reason for the growth of small ventures, particularly in developing 
economies (Bongomin et al., 2017). Accelerators programs are new addition to the cadre of 
entrepreneurship assistantship services, which are open to international applicants. In this paper,
we examined the influential factors on accelerators’ acceptance of entrepreneurial founding teams.
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Specifically, we studied the impacts of entrepreneurial features of founders including country of 
birth, gender, and education. We found that if a lead founder is from a developed country, such a 
venture will be more likely to be accepted by an accelerator, and less likely if a lead founder is 
from a developing country. Additionally and interestingly, we observed female business owners 
have a higher chance of acceptance than their male counterparts. Finally, yet importantly, we found 
that the founder team's educational level has a positive impact on accelerator acceptance. Our 
results were surprising in a variety of respects and have noteworthy implications for practitioners 
as well as applications of signaling theory.  
By bringing insights from signaling theory into the international entrepreneurship 
assistantship literature, we provided unique findings for the criteria that accelerators use for new 
venture selection. While the majority of literature mainly focuses on the outcome of accelerator 
acceptance, such as increased performance and innovativeness, much is left unknown for 
antecedents. We directly respond to the call for research on the criteria that might explain variation 
in accelerator acceptance (Drover et al., 2017). While some research examines the criteria at the 
venture level (e.g., Yang et al., 2020), the direct impact of individual-level factors is 
underexplored. We found that country of origin, while may not be a true representative of the 
individual’s skills and behavior, can be a source of bias. We found that education even irrelevant 
to entrepreneurship can have a positive impact on acceptance. 
We also extend female entrepreneurship literature by exploring the gender effect in the 
accelerator context. This is the first study that supports female advantage in the emerging context 
of accelerators, which is unique to the literature. Women’s participation in entrepreneurship is vital 
for economic growth (Brush et al., 2004) as they are the fastest-growing sector of new venture 
ownership in the US (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007). We extend the recent findings that suggest 
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women’s high likelihood of access to non-traditional resources such as crowdfunding (Greenberg 
and Mollick, 2017) and support this advantage in the context of accelerators. 
Our results would be helpful for policymakers and business owners, particularly female 
entrepreneurs by providing insights into the underlying reasons that might account for variation in 
access to non-traditional resources. Despite the numerous benefits of startups for the economy, 
there is a predominant gap in an assistantship, which forces new ventures to turn to non-traditional 
resources such as accelerator programs to fill the void (Radojevich-Kelley & Hoffman, 2012). 
Consequently, it is a vital practical matter for startup owners to get familiar with the factors that 
impact accelerator acceptance. CEOs such as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos have increasingly been 
the subject of media attention and academic literature (e.g., Koh, 2011).  Given our results, young 
firms that aspire to accelerator acceptance may wish to “sell” their image with a well-educated
lead founder who comes from a developed nation. Since accelerators are global resources open to 
international applicants, our study has practical implications for international entrepreneurs and 
policymakers by showing the impact that the development level of countries in access to 
international resources that assist entrepreneurial development. Governments are a key part of 
economic development (Galvão et al., 2017) and their informed decisions can enhance national 
prosperity. Having women also seems to be a helpful signal to increase the chance of acceptance. 
This is also important for policymakers who wish to improve gender equality and reform national 
settings. 
6. Limitations 
One important limitation of our study is that there is no data about the features of judges in the 
accelerator programs. Their individual aspects including country of origin, gender, and education 
have the potential to change the impact of these criteria on accelerator acceptance. Another 
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limitation is the lack of data about accelerators. Unfortunately, the ANDE database does not have 
any information on the accelerators themselves, and the countries in which they are located.
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entrepreneurialexperience_w -0.04*** 0.07*** 1.00
managerialexperience -0.03*** 0.07*** 0.30*** 1.00
profitability_w 0.01 0.01 0.07*** 0.04*** 1.00
socialsignals 0.02 0.04*** 0.03** 0.01 -0.04*** 1.00
economicsignals 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.09*** -0.04*** 0.01 1.00
selffundedpastyear -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.02* 1.00
Country-Birth 0.07*** 0.04*** -0.02* -0.05*** -0.15*** 0.08*** 0.14*** -0.06*** 1.00
genderfis1 0.05*** -0.07*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.03** 0.07*** -0.11*** -0.03** 0.05*** 1.00
Education_w 0.02* 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.09*** -0.04*** 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.07*** -0.03*** -0.10*** 1.00
N 10298
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 2. Regression Analysis Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Legal Status For-Profit 0.0978 0.100 0.122 0.0953 0.122
(0.0877) (0.0875) (0.0881) (0.0877) (0.0881)
Legal Status Non-Profit -0.182 -0.190 -0.181 -0.189 -0.198
(0.128) (0.131) (0.128) (0.128) (0.128)
Sector is Health 0.117 0.103 0.102 0.114 0.0834
(0.0842) (0.0846) (0.0844) (0.0843) (0.0848)
Sector is IT 0.0257 0.0206 0.0504 0.0253 0.0454
(0.0944) (0.0948) (0.0947) (0.0943) (0.0948)
Sector is Agriculture 0.0866 0.128 0.0793 0.0870 0.120
(0.100) (0.1000) (0.0997) (0.100) (0.101)
Sector is Other 0.258*** 0.248*** 0.238*** 0.266*** 0.240***
(0.0679) (0.0683) (0.0681) (0.0681) (0.0683)
Financial Goals 0.582*** 0.573*** 0.580*** 0.581*** 0.568***
(0.123) (0.125) (0.124) (0.123) (0.124)
Social Motive -0.148 -0.149 -0.172* -0.155 -0.184*
(0.0946) (0.0947) (0.0945) (0.0947) (0.0952)
Patents -0.0354 -0.0538 -0.0187 -0.0421 -0.0466
(0.0747) (0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0747) (0.0755)
Ln(Founder Age) 0.0879 0.0155 0.0676 0.0878 -0.00546
(0.0986) (0.0987) (0.0988) (0.0987) (0.100)
Entrepreneurial Experience -0.0440*** -0.0422*** -0.0356** -0.0454*** -0.0351**
(0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0152)
Impact Area Water 0.115 0.159 0.156 0.116 0.204
(0.165) (0.163) (0.166) (0.165) (0.166)
Impact Area Ag. Prod. -0.0231 0.0177 0.00115 -0.0274 0.0377
(0.103) (0.102) (0.102) (0.103) (0.104)
Impact Area Comm. Dev. -0.168** -0.164** -0.176** -0.165** -0.169**
(0.0711) (0.0708) (0.0713) (0.0712) (0.0714)
Impact Area Other 0.0464 0.0257 0.0533 0.0480 0.0346
(0.0783) (0.0786) (0.0784) (0.0783) (0.0787)
Managerial Experience -0.155*** -0.132** -0.142*** -0.162*** -0.129**
(0.0538) (0.0545) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0545)
Social Signals 0.240*** 0.210*** 0.226*** 0.233*** 0.186***
(0.0553) (0.0560) (0.0555) (0.0555) (0.0562)
Economic Signals 0.390*** 0.333*** 0.423*** 0.372*** 0.345***
(0.0701) (0.0710) (0.0705) (0.0707) (0.0724)
Self-Funded Past Year -0.176*** -0.168*** -0.174*** -0.182*** -0.174***
(0.0504) (0.0506) (0.0505) (0.0507) (0.0509)
Profitability 0.00665 0.0181 0.00626 0.00821 0.0198
(0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0143)
Country-Birth 0.109*** 0.108***
(0.0181) (0.0174)




Constant -2.122*** -2.856*** -2.151*** -2.260*** -3.061***
(0.380) (0.398) (0.381) (0.383) (0.400)
Observations 10,298 10,298 10,298 10,298 10,298
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1. Selection by Continent
